Es scheint, als wären wir ein halbes Jahrhundert lang an einem Denker vorbeigegangen, der uns zur Wissens- und Wissenschaftsproblematik mehr zu sagen hatte als mancher, den wir feiern. Gemeint ist der russische Philosoph Semen Ljudvigovic Frank. Auf der Basis seiner Forschungen versucht diese Studie systematisch-kritisch einen Neuansatz, der zu ungewohnten Konsequenzen vor allem in Wissenschaftstheorie, Anthropologie und Religionsphilosophie führt.

The focus here will be on the tension between architecture’s symbolic role and its function as a space to house and present art. ‘Symbolic’ refers both to a building as an aesthetic or sculptural form and secondly to its role in expressing civic identity. ‘Function’ refers to the intended purpose or practical use apart from its role as a form of art. As an art form, it serves important symbolic purposes; its practical purposes are linked to serving individual and community (...) functions requiring the delineation of space. In the present context of museum architecture, certain museum buildings are more likely to be seen as a sculptural object than as functioning buildings. The reasons for this development derive in part from unresolved issues pertaining to the respective roles of symbolic and practicalfunction as is seen in the analysis of architecture provided by G. W. F. Hegel, Rudolf Arnheim and Nelson Goodman. The vocabularies of contemporary architects such Frank Gehry and Santiago Calatrava do not follow the abstract geometrical patterns of Le Corbusier or Louis Kahn who envisioned a universal vocabulary of architectural forms derived from industrial technical forms that underscored Modernist conventions in architecture.By looking at this issue in the contexts provided by the theoretical discussions of Hegel, Arnheim and Goodman, it is possible to see more clearly the importance of examining with a critical eye the relative place of symbolism and function in museum architecture, and to question whether current museum practice has gone astray in allowing the sculptural symbolism to become the dominant element. When either its symbolic or its practical aspects are out of balance the result is sure to be unsatisfactory architecture. If the past is a reliable guide, it works best when the symbolic (sculptural) and the practical in architecture are worked out in harmony with each other. (shrink)

Suppose that the ultimate point of ethics is to make the world a better place. If it is, we must face the question: better in what respect? If the good is prior to the right — that is, if the rationale for all requirements of the right is that they serve to further the good in one way or another — then what is this good? Is there a single fundamental value capable of underlying and unifying all of our moral (...) categories? If so, how might it defeat the claims of rival candidates for this role? If not, is there instead a plurality of basic goods, each irreducible to any of the others? In that case, how do they fit together into a unified picture of the moral life? These are the questions I wish to address, in a necessarily limited way. To many the questions will seem hopelessly old-fashioned or misguided. Some deontologists will wish to reverse my ordering of the good and the right, holding that the right constrains acceptable conceptions of the good. For many contractarians, neither the good nor the right will seem normatively basic, since both are to be derived from a prior conception of rationality. Finally, some theorists will reject the classification of moral theories in terms of their basic normative categories, arguing that the whole foundationalist enterprise in ethics should be abandoned. In the face of these challenges to the priority of the good, and in light of the many current varieties of moral skepticism and relativism, I cannot provide a very convincing justification for raising the questions I intend to discuss. (shrink)

Moral philosophers agree that welfare matters. But they disagree about what it is, or how much it matters. In this vital new work, Wayne Sumner presents an original theory of welfare, investigating its nature and discussing its importance. He considers and rejects all notable theories of welfare, both objective and subjective, including hedonism and theories founded on desire or preference. His own theory connects welfare closely with happiness or life satisfaction. Reacting against the value pluralism that currently dominates moral philosophy, (...) he advances welfare as the only basic ethical value. He concludes by discussing the implications of this thesis for ethical and political theory. Written in clear, non-technical language, and including a definitive survey of other work in this area, Sumner's book is essential reading for moral philosophers, political theorists, and welfare economists. (shrink)

If I lead a life of virtue, that may well be good for you. But will it also be good for me? The idea that it will—or even must—is an ancient one, and its appeal runs deep. For if this idea is correct then we can provide everyone with a good reason—arguably the best reason—for being virtuous. However, for all the effort which has been invested in defending the idea, by some of the best minds in the history of philosophy, (...) it remains unproven. Worse, in this skeptical age hardly anyone really believes it. I don't really believe it either, at least not in its strongest forms, but I think that the question is nonetheless worth examining. Even if we cannot show that virtue and self-interest coincide, we can at least measure the breadth of the gap between them. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Hate Speech and the Law Two Theories of Rights Should Hate Speech be Free Speech? Hate Crimes and the Law.

I am grateful to John Woods and David Soles for the careful attention they have given to some of the central arguments of Abortion and Moral Theory, though I wish that they had revealed fewer respects in which those arguments were seriously underdeveloped. In what follows I will try to supply some of the needed further development. I address the main points at issue in what I conceive to be their order of ascending importance.

In this timely book L.W. Sumner addresses these issues within the wider context of palliative care for patients in the dying process.

What does it mean for someone to have a moral right to something? What kinds of creatures can have rights, and which rights can they have? While rights are indispensable to our moral and political thinking, they are also mysterious and controversial; as long as these controversies remain unsolved, rights will remain vulnerable to skepticism. Here, Sumner constructs both a coherent concept of a moral right and a workable substantive theory of rights to provide the moral foundation necessary to dispel (...) such doubts. (shrink)

These notes are the result of some work done a year or two ago on the Medicean MS. of Aeneas Tacticus1 in preparation for an edition of that unduly neglected author which I hope will soon see the light. I should not have thought it worth while to publish them separately were it not for two papers, at once laborious and brilliant, read by Mr. A. C. Clark to the Oxford Philological Society on the text of Cicero′s speeches, in May, (...) 1912, and February, 1913. The extreme plausibility with which the reader then explained numberless corruptions, transpositions, etc., in the text of Cicero, by reconstructing the length of line and pagination of the MSS. in their several degrees of descent, led me to think that it might be of some interest to publish the results at which I arrived by working on the same lines with a Greek author. In my case the problem has been a far simpler one, as I only had one MS. to deal with; but as I came to my own conclusions quite independently, before I knew that the method was being applied elsewhere, I give them for what they are worth, only too glad to find myself in such good company. (shrink)

In the longrunning war between the friends of knowledge and their sceptical enemies the moral front has always been one of the busiest. Here the sceptic assails us in the guise of the cunning and resourceful amoralist who disavows all ethical constraints. Some philosophers, seeing no prospect of defeating the amoralist by rational methods, have fallen back on a policy of containment by means of social and political sanctions. But others of a more truculent frame of mind have continued to (...) seek a decisive argumentative victory. (shrink)